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THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: INSTIGATING 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW’S CONSIDERATION OF 
FORCED MARRIAGE 
Valerie Oosterveld* 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) adopted a significant new 
legal approach when it investigated, prosecuted, and convicted individuals 
for forced marriage as a gender-related violation of international criminal 
law. In The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prof. Charles 
Jalloh discusses how the SCSL addressed the situation of Sierra Leonean 
“bush wives”—girls and women who were held in captivity during the civil 
war, “without consent or choice,” and assigned to serve, sexually and through 
domestic work, their soldier “husbands.”1 The SCSL’s Prosecutor 
investigated and prosecuted the violations committed against “bush wives,” 
categorizing them as the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts.”2 
As part of this process, the Office of the Prosecutor consulted with former 
“bush wives,” who indicated that they wanted the crime to be labelled “forced 
marriage,” as they felt that this term accurately described the harms they 
suffered.3 The SCSL’s Appeals Chamber, in the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case, defined forced marriage as “a 
perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words 
or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced 
conjugal association with another person resulting in great suffering, or 
serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim.”4 This definition, 
 
* Professor, University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law (Canada) and member of the Canadian 
Partnership for International Justice. The author wishes to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada for its research support. 
1 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 150, 162 
(2020). 
2 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, 
¶¶ 51–57 (Feb. 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended 
Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 60 (Aug. 2, 2006). 
3 Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Initial Structural and Procedural 
Decisions on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, 46 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 131, 145−47 (2015−2016). 
4 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 22, 
2008). This approach was also endorsed in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, ¶ 
735 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 26, 2009). Note, however, that the Trial Chamber of the ECCC stated: “The 
Chamber notes that the term ‘forced marriage’ has been used in international jurisprudence to cover a 
range of different factual circumstances. The Chamber is not satisfied that there exists a common 
understanding of this label.” Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea (ECCC Case 002/02 Trial Judgment), Case 002/02 
Judgment, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC ¶ 743 (Nov. 16, 2018). 
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and the SCSL’s subsequent analysis of—and convictions for—forced 
marriage in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) case, has had a significant 
and lasting impact on the understanding of forced marriage under 
international criminal law (ICL).5  
The SCSL’s recognition of forced marriage as a violation of 
international criminal law subsequently prompted two significant 
developments within the field. First, it led to the prosecution of forced 
marriage as an international crime in the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Second, it led to introspection within the international criminal law 
community, creating a deeper understanding of the harms stemming from 
forced marriage, and raising questions about the content of, and label for, the 
violation. These developments will be examined in turn.  
The SCSL’s groundbreaking jurisprudence on forced marriage has been 
referred to and relied upon in two tribunals. The ECCC prosecuted 
individuals for forced marriage committed during Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge 
regime.6 Many men and women were forced by Khmer Rouge state officials 
to marry in mass ceremonies, without choice of spouse, and subsequently 
coerced to have sex and procreate.7 The Trial Judgment analyzed forced 
marriage through the category of other inhumane acts, following the example 
set by the SCSL.8 The final Trial Judgment specifically quoted the definition 
of forced marriage set out by the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber,9 and ultimately 
concluded that: “Individuals . . . ‘consented’ to marriage out of fear, 
including the fear or threat of being placed in danger; subjected to various 
accusations including opposing Angkar; sent for re-education or 
refashioning; being moved to another location; or killed. . . . [T]he consent 
given was not genuine.”10 The accused were convicted of the forced marriage 
charges.11 
 
5 See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage During Conflict and Mass Atrocity, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND CONFLICT 240 (Naomi Cahn, Dina Haynes, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin 
& Nahla Valji eds., 2017); Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
Legal Advances and Conceptual Difficulties, 2 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 127 (2011) 
[hereinafter Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court]; Sara Wharton, The Evolution of 
International Criminal Law: Prosecuting ‘New’ Crimes Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2011); Melanie O’Brien, ‘Don’t Kill Them, Let’s Choose Them as Wives’: The 
Development of the Crimes of Forced Marriage, Sexual Slavery and Enforced Prostitution in 
International Criminal Law, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 386 (2016).  
6 ECCC Case 002/02 Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 3690–994. 
7 Id. ¶¶ 3690–91, 3696. 
8 Id. ¶¶ 741–49.  
9 Id. ¶ 744.  
10 Id. ¶¶ 3620 (footnotes omitted), 3623. 
11 Id. at Disposition page 2231. 
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The ICC has charged two accused with forced marriage, also under the 
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. In Prosecutor v. Ongwen, a 
former senior commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda 
was charged with, and convicted of, directly committing, and being 
responsible for, a system of “forced exclusive conjugal partners,” under 
which abducted girls and women were forced to serve as “wives” within his 
brigade in the 2002−2005 time period.12 Citing to the SCSL, the ICC defined 
forced marriage as “the imposition, regardless of the will of the victim, of 
duties that are associated with marriage – including in terms of exclusivity of 
the (forced) conjugal union imposed on the victim – as well as the consequent 
social stigma.”13 In Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, the accused, the 
former de facto chief of the Islamic police under armed groups Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, is charged with participating in a policy 
of forced marriages directed against the female inhabitants of Timbuktu, 
Mali, in 2012−2013.14 The Prosecutor argues that these forced marriages led 
to repeated rapes, sexual enslavement, and persecution of these women and 
girls.15 The Al Hassan trial opened on July 14−15, 2020. The SCSL’s 
jurisprudence on forced marriage has played a prominent role in the ICC’s 
consideration of forced marriage in both cases.16  
The SCSL’s jurisprudence has also prompted scholars to examine the 
phenomenon of forced marriage.17 One issue they have explored is the 
categorization of victims of forced marriage, since the SCSL defined 
victimhood largely in female terms18 and perpetrators as males.19 The focus 
 
12 Prosecutor v. Ongwen (Ongwen Trial Judgment), Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment 
¶¶ 3026, 3071, 3116 (Trial Chamber IX, Feb. 4, 2021); Prosecutor v. Ongwen (Ongwen Confirmation of 
Charges), Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Dominic Ongwen 
¶¶ 104–17, 136–38 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 23, 2016). 
13 Ongwen Trial Judgment, ¶ 2748. 
14 Prosecutor v. Aziz, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/18, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la 
confirmation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud ¶¶ 552–
651 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 13, 2019). 
15 Id. ¶ 563. 
16 E.g., Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, at ¶¶ 89, 93.  
17 E.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage: Terminological Coherence and Dissonance in 
International Criminal Law, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1263 (2019); Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as 
a Crime Against Humanity: Problems of Definition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1013 (2008); 
Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against Humanity?, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 53 (2009); Patricia V. Sellers, Wartime Female Slavery: Enslavement?, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115 
(2011). 
18 E.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 
22, 2008) (“forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ which 
could lead to disciplinary consequences [of the ‘wife’ by the ‘husband’] for breach of this exclusive 
relationship.”). 
19 For example, the Appeals Chamber’s definition of forced marriage refers to “the perpetrator or 
those associated with him.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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of the SCSL was on the “bush wife” phenomenon created by the RUF and 
AFRC rebels, in which the victims appearing before the court were girls and 
women and the perpetrators were identified as male fighters. As a result, the 
analysis by the SCSL was cast in this paradigm of female victims and male 
perpetrators, and many commentators have since understandably focused on 
this scenario, given the large numbers of female victims of forced marriage 
in conflicts around the world.20 The ECCC presented a different scenario, in 
which the victims were both male and female, and the perpetrators were male 
and female officials of the Khmer Rouge.21 Subsequent research has 
indicated that victims and perpetrators of forced marriage may be both female 
and male. There may be boys and men forced to become “husbands” who are 
coerced into this role through policies aimed at increasing internal 
compliance and allegiance to a particular fighting group.22 This research 
helps to bring further nuance to the understanding of forced marriage 
victimhood, given that “forced marriage as a mechanism of atrocity may 
assume different forms in different places.”23 Therefore, Denov and Drumbl 
urge a focus on coercion (“imposing a compelled association”) of all affected 
parties.24 
Another key issue of contention and discussion among commentators 
relates to the term “forced marriage.” The Taylor Trial Chamber, and experts 
such as Sellers, advocate replacing the term with a legal label that more 
accurately captures the harms under consideration, such as “conjugal 
slavery” or “slavery” simpliciter.25 The reasons are twofold: first, in cases 
 
20 E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations 
Secretary-General, ¶¶ 14, 20, 31, 37, 40, 70, U.N. Doc. S/2020/487 (June 3, 2020). 
21 Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea, Case 002/02 Judgment, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC ¶¶ 
3690–94 (Nov. 16, 2018). For an analysis of how the ECCC analyzed male victims of rape within forced 
marriages in the Case 002/02 Trial Judgment, see Elinor Fry & Elies van Sliedregt, Targeted Groups, 
Rape and Dolus Eventualis: Assessing the ECCC’s Contributions to Substantive International Criminal 
Law, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 701 (2020). 
22 Denov and Drumbl identify, through ethnographic research, boys and men who were forced into 
“marriage” so as to deepen their enmeshment within the Lord’s Resistance Army. Myriam S. Denov & 
Mark A. Drumbl, The Many Harms of Forced Marriage: Insights for Law from Ethnography in Northern 
Uganda, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 349, 357, 359, 361 (2020). The relationships within the forcibly created 
families were rendered “an expression of captivity.” Id. at 361. They also indicate that such individuals 
may simultaneously be victims and victimizers. Id. at 366–67; see also Omer Aijazi & Erin Baines, 
Relationality, Culpability and Consent in Wartime: Men’s Experiences of Forced Marriage, 11 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 463 (2017). 
23 Denov & Drumbl, supra note 22, at 371. 
24 Id. at 367. 
25 Prosecutor v. Taylor (Taylor Trial Judgment), Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶ 428 (Trial 
Chamber II May 18, 2012); Sellers, supra note 17, at 142. See also Zawati, who proposes “marital slavery” 
as an alternative label. HILMI ZAWATI, FAIR LABELLING AND THE DILEMMA OF PROSECUTING GENDER-
BASED CRIMES AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 129 (2014). See also Annie Bunting, 
‘Forced Marriage’ in Conflict Situations: Researching and Prosecuting Old Harms and New Crimes, 1 
CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 165, 179–80 (2012) (arguing for classification of forced marriage as enslavement). 
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where there is no legal union (such as in the “bush wife” context), they feel 
that it is a misnomer to refer to the violation as a form of marriage.26 They 
argue that the reference to “marriage” in these scenarios obscures the fact that 
the victims are, in many circumstances, enslaved.27 Secondly, they express 
concern that the reference to “marriage” may unintentionally serve to 
legitimate patriarchal understandings of marriage, in which women are 
expected to serve men.28 On the other hand, scholars recognize that there is 
an important expressive function in the term “forced marriage” for some 
victims.29 
In sum, the SCSL prompted a major shift in understanding in 
international criminal law. As a result of the SCSL’s analysis and subsequent 
consideration in other tribunals, forced marriage is comprehended as a 
multifaceted set of harms. At the same time, the SCSL’s introduction of 
forced marriage has triggered a deeper examination and questioning by 
international criminal law scholars and practitioners—a healthy and logical 




Note that there is also a debate on the harm that is captured by the term “forced marriage”: should the 
focus be on the imposition of the status of “marriage” itself, or is it on the constellation of harms that 
accompany the imposition of this status (such as sexual slavery, domestic slavery, forced pregnancy, 
forced childrearing, etc.)? See, e.g., Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at 
143–48.   
26 Taylor Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 425, 427. 
27 Sellers, supra note 17, at 142. 
28 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at 154–55; Binaifer 
Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 
18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 102 (2005). 
29 Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court, supra note 5, at 138–41; see also Annie 
Bunting & Izevbuwa Kehinde Ikhimiukor, The Expressive Nature of Law: What We Learn from Conjugal 
Slavery to Forced Marriage in International Criminal Law, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 331, 349–52 (2018). 
